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Yanbian was founded for reasons of foreign policy. The Qing rulers needed to respond both to the pressure of Han and Korean immigration and to the threats posed by Russia and Japan. In 1858 and 1860, two treaties were signed that drew the frontier between the Chinese and Russian empires: China lost an immense sweep of territory, including its access to the East Sea (Sea of Japan). The meeting point of the Russian, Korean and Chinese frontiers was then fixed on the northern bank of the Tumen river about 15 kilometres from the coast 8 . At the same time, Han and Korean peasants, from the Chinese provinces of Shandong and Hebei respectively, and from the northern provinces of Korea, began to settle illegally in the Yanbian region 9 . This illegal immigration into Chinese territory, on the fringes of Korea and Russia, greatly troubled the Qing court. Indeed, while it helped to populate the frontier regions, this immigration nevertheless had to be controlled, lest it be exploited by the Russians and the Japanese whose influence in Korea was growing 10 . Lastly, by welcoming the immigrants, China could show that it offered protection to the Korean population and could thus increase its influence in the domestic affairs of the peninsular, which the Korean authorities were finding increasingly hard to control, and fend off its Russian and Japanese enemies. However, when Japan established its domination of Korea, at the start of the twentieth century, it took the large Korean population in the clearance area as a pretext for justifying new territorial ambitions. For Japan, these people, just like those on the peninsular, had to be afforded its "protection". The Korean population of Yanbian then became a real issue between the Chinese and Japanese authorities, with each government attempting to win its support 11 . Even though a section of the Yanbian Koreans aligned itself with Japan-which moved into Yanbian as early as 1907 and then into the rest of Manchuria in 1931-most of them joined the communist camp and struggled against the invader.
promulgated, that policy towards the national minorities was to become more lenient and that the term "regional autonomy" came to mean something again. 13 In Yanbian, this revival took concrete form in 1985 with the promulgation of regulations laying down the law on the autonomy of the prefecture (Yanbian Chaoxianzu zizhizhou zizhi tiaoli) and the representation of Koreans in local political and administrative bodies. A year later, the prefecture authorities published three other regulations on the use of the Korean language, the development of traditional Chaoxianzu culture and the production of traditional Korean products; the regulations also set up a body responsible for promoting economic and cultural exchanges with foreign countries (haiwai lianyi hui). In all, more than 70 regulations were implemented between 1985 and 1988, concerning, among other things, agriculture, forestry, science, education, health, family planning, taxation and commerce 14 .
14 These reforms followed the visit to Yanbian in 1983 by Deng Xiaoping, during which he declared himself in favour of "a swift and improved building up of the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture" (ba Yanbian Chaoxianzu zizhizhou jianshe de geng kuai xie geng hao xie), thus marking the first stage towards opening up the prefecture's frontier with the outside world 15 .
The strategic motivation behind the opening up of the frontier 15 The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution had left the Party's credibility greatly diminished and had poisoned relationships between the Koreans and the Han. Deng's visit and the renewal of economic development were a means for the Party to win back the confidence of the Yanbian Koreans. This new attitude had a further aim: Peking's new policy towards the Korean peninsular might profit from the co-operation of China's Chaoxianzu 16 . 16 Firstly, the central government needed to revive its relations with North Korea's leaders. Indeed, the normalisation of China's diplomatic relations with Japan and then the United States during the 1970s as well as the opening up of the market economy in 1978 were sharply criticised by North Korea, which then tightened its links with the USSR. Secondly, the government wished to restore its position at the centre of Northeast Asia, not only by rebuilding its relationship with the Soviet Union (and later Russia) but also by acting as go-between in bringing the two Koreas together. To that end, the Chinese government had to opt for normalising its relations with the south while taking care not to put a strain on its links with the north. The closeness of these links was proving all the more important in that the appearance of serious economic difficulties might threaten the survival of the North Korean regime, which might in turn leave the Chinese government fearful for the stability of its frontier.
17 In order to confront these numerous issues, from the end of the 1980s, the central government allied itself with provincial and local initiatives to implement a new economic policy, symbolised by the Tumen River Area Development Programme. This programme was designed, among other objectives, to promote the economic development of Yanbian, to offer the prefecture access to South Korea and to help launch North Korea along the path of reform 17 . The policy satisfied a national need by enabling China to narrow the currently growing gap between Yanbian's slow economic development and the rapid advances being made in the coastal provinces, a gap that might feed local discontent in Yanbian and also threaten the stability of the frontier 18 .
18 Thus, when Jiang Zemin, then Secretary General of the Party, visited Yanbian between 7 and 9 January 1991, he proclaimed the central government's wish to make Yanbian a "model prefecture" for the whole country. He encouraged the local authorities to parade the various advantages that the prefecture enjoyed, such as its "ideal geographical position" on the frontiers of Russia and North Korea and in the centre of Northeast Asia, its rich natural resources (such as wood and medicinal plants) and its picturesque landscape (mainly with tourism in mind) 19 . He repeatedly encouraged the local authorities to continue exploiting the ethnic network of the Korean population so as to form closer economic and trading links with the two Koreas 20 .
The openness strategy of the 1990s and its problemsThe launch of the Tumen project 19 The start of the reforms took the form of reopening the frontier with North Korea, which had been closed since the start of the Cultural Revolution. First of all, the Chinese and North Korean authorities established relations between localities ( 21 ), and then they reactivated treaties signed during the 1950s and the early 1960s, among them an agreement on cross-border movement 22 . Trade was also built up, reaching a value of 52 million dollars by 1989 23 . This reopening was encouraged by an important political act, the visit to Yanbian in 1984 of Hu Yaobang, then Secretary General of the CCP, and Kim IlSung, whose regime promulgated in September of that year a law allowing foreign investment.
20 However, some local and provincial leaders judged this reopening to be economically inadequate. In their view, these two administrative entities of Northeast China were lagging behind the coastal provinces in development because the region was isolated, having been cut off from access to the East Sea (Sea of Japan) since the latter half of the nineteenth century. This is when the idea of establishing an economic zone around the meeting point of the Chinese, Russian and North Korean frontiers, with the financial support of Japan, South Korea and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), was first mooted. This local project, which was called, symbolically, the Tumen River Economic Development Zone, was aimed at renovating existing infrastructure and building new projects to improve transport (roads, railways, port installations and frontier posts) so as to regain access to the sea by using the Russian ports of Zarubino and Posjet and the North Korean ports of Rajin and Chongjin. 21 During the first half of the 1990s, the central government took an active part in the financing of the infrastructure. With its international objectives in mind, it gave strong encouragement to the local authorities to attract investment from abroad by creating, in Hunchun in March 1992, a frontier zone of economic co-operation (bianjing jingji hezuoqu), a project driven directly from Peking; and it gave the go-ahead to the Jilin authorities for several economic development zones at the provincial level across the rest of the prefecture 24 . In addition, the central government played a key role in encouraging the North Korean authorities to set up the economic zone of Rajin-Sonbong in 1991 and in persuading them not to leave the Tumen programme when they threatened to do so at the time of the first nuclear crisis in 1994. It was also a Chinese company in Yanbian, the Xiantong Haiyun Jituan Youxian Gongsi that, as the only company using the port of Rajin, was largely responsible for its renovation, relieving the failing North Korea of this task 25 . 33 . So the isolation of the prefecture is still a reality. Moreover, the main trade routes between Yanbian and South Korea and between Yanbian and Japan-which remain modest despite, admittedly, experiencing steady growth-go through the port of Dalian, neglecting the ports in the Tumen zone even though they are much closer.
Persistent economic difficulties
Why the impetus has been lost 26 The economic difficulties of Yanbian find their explanation in the numerous obstacles that the Tumen programme has encountered-and continues to encounter 34 .
27 Because of the inadequate transport and port infrastructure, access to the sea-which was, after all, the initial aim of the project-is still not completely operational. The investment needed is lacking; the failure to complete the infrastructure is a handicap to trade and puts off foreign investors. State investment by the Chinese central authorities also dwindled in the second half of the 1990s 35 . There are two main reasons for this reduction. As a programme for cross-border co-operation, the Tumen programme cannot succeed without the active participation of the Russian and North Korean partners. Yet the considerable political reluctance of the local Russian authorities in Primorskiy and of the North Korean government has contributed strongly to slowing down the project. Moreover, the nuclear crisis of 1994 and the death of Kim Il-Sung strained relations between Pyongyang and Peking. At the same time, the launch of the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) turned Peking's attention towards the development of China's central and western provinces, which largely explains the stronger economic growth achieved in the autonomous prefectures of these regions. 28 Within the prefecture, the Tumen programme has also been paralysed by the numerous tensions that it has itself created between Yanbian's main centres. Indeed, the lion's share of the profit has gone to the frontier municipality of Hunchun, which received the majority of the investments from Peking, while the railway connecting Yanji to North Korea via Longjing was renovated only with the help of local funding. This unequal treatment, deliberate on the part of the central government, has had the effect of sowing discontent among the areas that believe they have lost out in the unfolding of the programme (including Yanji, Longjing and Helong) 36 .
29 While the implementation of the Tumen programme has enabled the central government to use Yanbian and its Korean minority to further its strategy aimed at the two Koreas, active Korean participation also appears essential for the successful economic development of this prefecture. Yet North Korean reluctance and the overly timid economic participation of South Korean investors have combined to damage it fatally. The absence of economic prospects for Yanbian in the context of the opening up of the frontier has a number of consequences for the Korean minority, which is, in turn, causing problems, diplomatic ones in particular, for the Chinese authorities.
The consequences for the Korean minority of opening up the frontier the trust placed in the Korean minority. Because the Chaoxianzu were strongly politicised and relatively faithful to the CCP, the central government then qualified them as "a model minority", and they considered themselves as Chinese people of Korean origin. This double identity, which is common among immigrant populations, was reinforced by the important political role that the Korean minority had played in the history of the People's Republic as well as by the different policies that the central government directed towards it 37 . So, just as it had done in the past, the central government again played on the double identity of the Chaoxianzu in the early 1980s in the hope that they would play a positive role in reconciling the two Koreas. Here again, however, the outcome fell far short of the intention.
An economic and social malaise driving people to emigrate 31 The economic slowdown in the second half of the 1980s particularly affected the Korean minority. In Yanbian, Koreans were mainly employed in producing rice, fruit (primarily apples) and tobacco, and they suffered the full force of the competition whipped up by the reform policy 38 . Unlike the Han, they would not, or could not, adapt 39 . The impact was immediate. The Koreans saw their incomes drop and the gap widen between them and the Han. While the situation in the towns is relieved by the employment of some Koreans in foreign trade and by the availability of work in South Korea, many Koreans are still wretchedly poor 40 . These social problems have driven ever more Koreans to emigrate from Yanbian, a process that began from the moment the frontier was opened.
32 The Yanbian Koreans have migrated in the following three ways, though not necessarily in this order 41 . First there was the rural exodus. Hard hit by the reforms, many Korean peasants fled the countryside to the prefecture's main urban centres. In 2000, the three municipalities of Yanji, Hunchun and Dunhua, the location of the urban centres of the same name that have profited most by development, were the only administrative entities to record a positive migratory balance, unlike the municipalities of Longjing, Helong and Tumen, to which rural Koreans have flocked in great numbers (see Table 4 ). When they do not go to the main urban centres within the prefecture, the Koreans flee Yanbian for the great developed cities of China where economic prospects are best. As well as Peking and the four great cities of the northeast (Harbin, Changchun, Shenyang and Dalian), migrants favour the Shandong municipalities (such as Jinan, Qingdao and Yantai) and those of the other coastal provinces. Lastly, the opening of the Yanbian frontier has offered new prospects for immigration. At first, the Yanbian Koreans made their way to North Korea and the Soviet Union, but the economic difficulties of these countries brought such population movements rapidly to an end. Salvation came in the renewal of trading relations between China and South Korea at the end of the 1980s and then in the normalisation of diplomatic links in 1992. South Korea has since become a real El Dorado, and it is to here that many Koreans from Yanbian and elsewhere in China attempt legally or illegally to migrate, mainly to work. According to some estimates, Chinese Koreans there numbered 23,000 in 1992 and over 40,000 by 1994 42 . By spring 2000, 92,000 were officially registered by the South Korean authorities but, according to some estimates that included illegal immigrants, their number had risen to 150,000 or 200,000, which is more than half the immigrant workforce settled in South Korea 43 . While it is difficult to estimate the exact proportion of those who came from Yanbian, there is no doubt that it is significant. Indeed, since the frontiers opened, about 200,000 Yanbian Koreans have gone abroad 44 .
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33 At the same time, and partly linked to this emigration, a slowdown has been recorded since the early 1990s in the growth of the Yanbian Korean population. Caused by a significant fall in the birth rate, population growth even became negative in the second half of the 1990s (see Table 5 ). The fall in the birth rate is largely explained by the malefemale imbalance in the countryside over several previous years; as a result of the high level of female emigration, this imbalance became particularly apparent during the 1990s. Today, the figures indicate that there are four men for every woman in the Yanbian countryside 45 . 
The influence of the Chaoxianzu in Korean affairs
34 Economically limited, the main influence of the Chaoxianzu in Korean affairs is social and humanitarian. Particularly striking is the help they give to North Korean refugees. 35 The number of North Korean refugees now living in Yanbian is difficult to estimate. This is a sensitive subject; and, because the movements of refugees are fluid, any census is almost impossible. The few available figures concern the number of refugees in China and are unhelpful, varying between 10,000 and 300,000 according to different estimates 46 . Despite these variations, the Yanbian prefecture still seems to shelter the great majority of the refugees present on Chinese soil. The flow of refugees into Yanbian, which was very significant between 1998 and 2001, largely dried up during 2002. Alongside the various campaigns of repression, the renewal of frontier trade also appears responsible for this fall 47 . Trade between the frontier towns of Yanbian and their North Korean neighbours, mainly stimulated by the Chaoxianzu, thus saves a few North Koreans from having to flee into China to survive.
36 When they do arrive in Yanbian, the North Koreans are often helped by the Chaoxianzu. While it is much too dangerous for the latter to welcome the refugees into their homesand this is true even if they are members of their family-they attempt to help them by providing food or finding jobs for them in farming or forestry. Lastly, the bolder spirits help the refugees to flee to South Korea via a third country (such as Mongolia or Thailand) or via one of the many foreign embassies based in Peking.
37 This solidarity is not systematic, however. Some refugees are, on the contrary, subject to the arbitrary control of the local people or to organised crime networks. Of these, women are in the front line. According to some studies, 70-75% of the North Korean refugees in China are women and, of these, about 60% settle in Yanbian. This female surplus is exacerbated by the male-female imbalance in country areas of the prefecture. A large number of marriages are arranged between single rural Chaoxianzu men and women refugees from North Korea 48 .
38 Lastly, because the Chaoxianzu are able to move freely into each of the two Koreas, they frequently act as go-betweens in arranging meetings or carry letters between North and South Koreans 49 .
The "de-Koreanisation" of Yanbian and the question of Korean identity 39 Emigration and the slowdown in population growth have the combined effect of reducing the proportion of Yanbian Koreans within the wider community of Chinese Koreans. Whereas, in 1949, the Yanbian prefecture sheltered more than 60% of China's Koreans, today that proportion has fallen to 40% (see Table 6 ). In the longer term, this phenomenon raises the question of Korean representation within the governing bodies of the autonomous prefecture 50 . Indeed, according to the 1982 law, the proportion of officials drawn from a minority community in local political and administrative bodies must reflect its share of the overall population of the autonomous area. Thus, between 1952 and 2001, in parallel with the relative fall in the numbers of Koreans in Yanbian's total population, the proportion of Korean officials has dropped from 78% to 43.1% 51 . Admittedly, the Chinese authorities have guaranteed that national minorities should fill the senior posts in the autonomous areas and that their share of officials should always remain above their share of the total population ( 52 ); but how will things turn out? At the local level, this imbalance is perceived as a serious problem, and to address it the prefecture authorities have been attempting for some time to encourage a higher birth rate 53 . 40 The depopulation of Yanbian also threatens the Korean identity of the Chaoxianzu. Their departure from Yanbian to settle in other towns means that many schools are forced to close down, but similar schools are not necessarily available at their new homes. Thus they are increasingly being assimilated within Chinese Han society 54 . Still worse, according to many Korean intellectuals, the Korean minority is at present on the verge of disintegration 55 .
41 Such disintegration is all the more critical because opening up Yanbian to Korean influences has not strengthened the Korean identity of the Chaoxianzu. On the contrary, the Chaoxianzu have become so disillusioned in rediscovering the two Koreas that their Chinese patriotism has only intensified. 42 Chinese Koreans, for so long attached to North Korea, which they consider their country of origin, have been badly disappointed by political and economic developments in their motherland. The personality cult of the supreme leader, the emergence of a Kim dynasty, the Juche ideology, the total absence of individual freedom and the plight of refugees are elements of which they are sharply critical 56 . Only family ties still connect them with North Korea, which they hope will soon be opened up economically. 43 Most of the Chinese Koreans who have been to South Korea have also been badly disappointed. Their excitement at visiting this country and their chance to savour its high level of economic development have been soured by the discovery of a culture and a social existence that was quite different from theirs and to which they were unable to adapt 57 . What is worse, confronted daily by discriminatory laws, they have not found themselves treated as real Koreans. By limiting their freedom to settle down and by making their lives difficult, these laws create a persistently negative image of South Korea among the Chaoxianzu, many of whom return to China determined never to repeat the experience 58 . 44 The numerous contacts that they have had with the two Koreas have therefore consolidated the double identity of the Chinese Koreans. They have today a much more pragmatic vision of the peninsular, considering it merely as an important economic and political partner. As citizens, first and foremost, of the People's Republic, the Yanbian Koreans do not represent a real threat to the stability of the Sino-Korean frontier 59 . During the 1980s and 1990s, the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture was described several times by Peking and by the Jilin provincial authorities as the "model collectivity" (mofan jiti), meaning that the union between the nationalities there was judged to be satisfactory 60 . Nevertheless, other sources have qualified this idealised view. They consider that the Korean minority is an intermediate nationality, "neither cold nor hot" ( bu leng bu re); it is not inclined to separatism, as is the case with national minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang, but neither is it "without risk to the social and political stability of the region", particularly because of the relations it maintains with some citizens of the two Koreas 61 . 45 This ambivalent situation, which varies from person to person, obliges the central government to be wary of the Chaoxianzu, especially when they cause problems for its diplomatic relations with the two Koreas.
The problems caused by the Yanbian Chaoxianzu to China's relations with Korea 46 The migration of Chinese Koreans to South Korea and the support they offer to North Korean refugees are frequently the cause of diplomatic clashes between China and the two Korean states. These problems are all the more embarrassing in that a significant criminal factor is involved.
A border opening onto numerous geopolitical issues China Perspectives, 48 | july-august 2003 62 . While it helped to avoid any friction with the Chinese government, this exclusion provoked uproar among the immigrant Chaoxianzu population and also among South Korean Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), who organised numerous demonstrations in Seoul and sent a petition to the country's Constitutional Court. This pressure from part of society obliged the central government to think again. On 31 August 1999, President Kim Dae-Jung called on the government to reflect on measures that would enable Koreans from China and Russia to enjoy the same rights as Koreans from other countries 63 . On 10 July 2001, following a report by several NGOs condemning the discrimination and ill-treatment inflicted on some Chinese Koreans in South Korea, the justice minister promised to "humanise" his policy towards them and also to crack down on groups or individuals who exploit them ( 64 70 . While the central government tolerated, until recent months, the presence of these NGOs-as long as they remained discreet-it considers their participation in organising expeditions to the embassies to be in violation of Chinese sovereignty. As these NGOs have also deeply embarrassed the Chinese government in its relations with North and South Korea, it has responded immediately by cracking down not only on the refugees but also on their accomplices 71 . Furthermore, while the repression of the Chaoxianzu is an internal matter for the Chinese, the crackdown on the South Korean NGOs is closely watched by the Seoul authorities-the more so in that some of the NGOs (many being religious in character) are also playing a leading part in defending the Chaoxianzu in South Korea. Some active members of the Christian NGOs were thus arrested by the Chinese police who accused them of proselytising, which is forbidden in China 72 . However, being anxious not to get into a row with Seoul, the Chinese authorities imposed limited penalties, in most cases freeing them after they had paid heavy fines. These diplomatic limitations explain why Peking is also attempting to obstruct the work of these NGOs at an earlier stage by preventing them from coming to China. A black list naming some of their leaders has been sent to the Chinese embassy in South Korea, which is ordered not to issue any more visas to them 73 .
The emergence of an illegal traffic in refugees 52 As many Chinese (including Chaoxianzu) as Koreans from the peninsular are involved in the criminal network, which is a growing presence in the region. The transporting of Chaoxianzu to South Korea is accompanied, for example, by a significant traffic in South Korean passports, forged marriage certificates and work permits. It is more and more common for South Koreans in Yanbian and the Chinese Northeast to find that their passports have been stolen or unfortunately misplaced. As for forged marriage certificates, these can also have two uses: some of them can be used to create a marriage between a Chaoxianzu man and a woman refugee from North Korea. Most of the time, these arranged marriages are in fact forced marriages. The criminal gangs quickly understood how to benefit from the situation and they have put in place a significant network for smuggling women whom they sell to the peasants in Yanbian or elsewhere. Those who are not sold are switched into the region's many prostitution networks. Lastly, in addition to being a centre for the traffic in women, Yanbian is also an important transit area for drugs coming in from North Korea, most of which are eventually sold in South Korea 74 .
53 While the Chinese and South Korean governments have agreed to co-operate in dismantling the various trafficking networks, some differences persist over the best methods to adopt. A much-needed new start for development: xibu dakaifa to the rescue of Tumen? 55 The numerous connections maintained by the Chaoxianzu with the South Korean NGOs and the North Korean refugees led to the organisation of the sanguan jiaoyu campaign during the spring and summer of 2002 76 . Indeed, even though Chinese studies show that the majority of the Yanbian Koreans still consider themselves Chinese, the researchers emphasise the need to strengthen their patriotism and their sense of cohesion with other nationalities (that is with the Han) by improving education 77 . However, the Chinese government is aware that mere educational reforms will not be enough to resolve the problems. It has recently been attempting to relaunch economic development in the prefecture. Thus, after setting up a processing and export zone (chukou jiagong qu) in Hunchun, in April 2000 ( 78 ), on 8 March 2001 the State Council authorised the Yanbian prefecture to receive the benefits of the policy of the "Great Opening Up of the West" ( xibu dakaifa) 79 . This decision was prompted, above all, by growing pressure from the Yanbian authorities (passed on doubtless by those of Jilin province) who, confronted with the failure of the Tumen programme, wished to relaunch Yanbian's development 80 . Although the prefecture is situated on the edge of the Northeast, the authorities maintained that Yanbian was an old, poor administrative frontier entity inhabited by national minorities and could, given these characteristics, benefit just as much from this policy as the other autonomous prefectures located in the western provinces 81 . So since March 2001 Yanbian has been receiving new state subsidies and a more advantageous fiscal regime which ought to enable it to attract more foreign investment across a greater number of sectors and to profit a little more from its own fiscal resources. It is also authorised to adopt a few measures to protect the environment and to develop scientific and technical education as well as zones of economic and technological co-operation. Lastly, Yanbian has been offered new prerogatives in promoting tourism and frontier trade. 84 . On a second visit to China, during January 2001, he also went to Shanghai 85 . Lastly, in September 2001, Jiang Zemin visited Pyongyang for the first time in ten years, which, after all the tensions of the second half of the 1990s, thus symbolised the restoration of good relations between the two countries 86 . In addition to strategic questions (including TMD, NMD and the presence of American troops in South Korea), these meetings also provided an opportunity for the two governments to discuss economic development. Kim Jong-Il having praised to the skies the successes of the Chinese reforms, it is not surprising that, following these meetings, the North Korean regime adopted numerous openness measures between 2000 and autumn 2002. 59 China's closer links with North Korea have since been overshadowed by a second nuclear crisis, which attests once again to the volatile, unpredictable and above all dangerous behaviour of the North Korean regime as well as to the complexity of the PekingPyongyang relationship. Annoyed by this behaviour, the Chinese government has taken political and strategic measures that have directly affected Yanbian. For example, Peking has told all North Korean officials-those who had been allowed to stay in the prefecture to hunt down refugees-to return home 88 .
60 While it is too soon to analyse what the relaunch of the Tumen development will lead to, it is clear that its success will depend not just on resolving this second nuclear crisis but also and more particularly on overcoming Yanbian's present economic problems (skills shortage, problematic restructuring of state enterprises, inadequate foreign investment and low levels of cross-border trade) 89 . The task ahead appears all the more arduous in that China's recent accession to the World Trade Organisation is likely to cause new difficulties for the prefecture, particularly in agriculture-which still accounts for 16% of Yanbian's GDP-and the many state enterprises 90 . Lastly, the Tumen development cannot go ahead without a significant inflow of foreign investment, especially from South Korea. 61 We shall also have to watch closely what impact the relaunch of the development will have on the changing identity of the Chaoxianzu. That most Yanbian Koreans still feel themselves to be Chinese can largely be attributed to the disillusionment that many have felt in South Korea. The geopolitical importance of the Korean minority depends above all on China's relations with the peninsular. From this perspective, because of the reactions it will provoke within the Chinese government and among the Chaoxianzu, the revision of the South Korean law affecting Koreans from abroad will without any doubt mark a critical stage in the relationship between the two countries. It will also represent a basic gauge of the prospects for Korean reunification. Even though it is hard to foresee what form the new Korean discourse on the frontier and on China's Korean minority will take, it is likely that the influence exerted by a reunified Korea on Yanbian and its Koreans will again be enormous. While one cannot put aside the possibility of destabilising influences ( 91 ), reunification-and, of course, before that, the opening up of North Korea-could have a very positive effect on economic development, both for Yanbian and for all of China's Koreans. In view of its frontier position, the Yanbian prefecture could then become Korea's back door into China and thus profit by its geographical situation in the heart of Northeast Asia. However, this success will also depend on what strategic perceptions Chinese leaders will then have of the peninsular, for these still govern their policy towards Yanbian and the Korean minority. 
NOTES
1.The People's Republic of China is home to 2,188,000 Koreans, 97% of whom live in the three provinces of the Northeast (Jilin: 61%; Heilongjiang: 23%; Liaoning: 12%). In Jilin, apart from the Autonomous Prefecture of Yanbian, the Koreans are also strongly represented in the autonomous county of Changbai (home to 16% of the nationwide Korean population) as well as eleven villages, of which five are Korean-Manchu, and one town. In Heilongjiang and Liaoning, the Korean minority lives mainly in villages (26) and towns (10 6.Sanguan jiaoyu is an education movement organised by the central government and the provincial authorities whenever the latter judge that unity between the nationalities is in danger, whether because tension arises between the Han and the minorities or because the minority or the minorities step outside certain guidelines laid down by the authorities. This type of campaign is invariably aimed at the national minorities and is always carried out in minority areas (provinces, prefectures or counties). As its name suggests, the sanguan jiaoyu is the teaching of the three guan (which we may translate as idea, concept or conception). These three concepts are zhuguoguan (zhu = to reside, guo = country, namely China; no one should forget that the national minorities reside in the country, that is to say in China), minzuguan (no one should forget that these are nationalities of China, a multinational state and that they enjoy certain privileges at the political, economic and social level) and lishiguan (lishi = history; no one should forget that historically the minorities are part of China and that they have participated in the founding of this multinational state). The exact definition of the three concepts is a little vague; the few researchers who refer to them also give no precise definitions. To sum up, the sanguan jiaoyu is a campaign aimed at making the national minorities aware that the country, the state and China are more important than their nationality and that, while the specific nationality is respected (from the perspective of the centre), the national minorities must not set it above the state. 39.According to Outi Luova, the Yanbian Koreans were unable to adapt to the reforms for three reasons. Firstly, they were too attached to their traditional cultivation of rice and were reluctant to commit themselves to other activities. Secondly, being faithful to their
